10 Questions for Jon Corzine

Jon S. Corzine, the former chief executive of MF Global Holdings and a former Democratic senator from New Jersey, is being forced to return to Capitol Hill on Thursday morning.

The House Agricultural Committee subpoenaed Mr. Corzine after he resisted the committee’s request that he voluntarily answer questions.

It’s a reversal of fortune for the man once mentioned as a potential Treasury secretary. Mr. Corzine’s pain may be brief. Mr. Corzine is likely being advised by his lawyers to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We’ll soon find out if he listens to his lawyers.

If Mr. Corzine turns out to be more voluble, here are some questions the committee may want to ask:

1. You were chief executive of MF Global with day-to day responsibility for the entire operation. Yet, it appears that you were personally responsible for structuring and monitoring the $6.35 billion trade in sovereign European debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Belgium — a bet that spooked investors and the ratings agencies, ultimately bringing down the firm.

You took on this responsibility despite the fact you had been a politician for more than a decade and were likely not as familiar with markets as you were when you were at Goldman Sachs. Why did you feel the need to personally trade for MF Global instead of having a trader or trading group do it? Who did you speak to structure and monitor this trade, particularly since you were preoccupied with running this entire business?

2. Your chief risk officer, Michael Roseman, warned you against this bet on troubled sovereign European debt, according to The Wall Street Street Journal. Mr. Roseman reportedly thought that the trade was too risky because MF Global did not have sufficient liquidity to sustain its positions if the firm was downgraded by the ratings agencies. Can you tell us what Mr. Roseman told you, whether his concerns were relayed to the board of directors and why you ignored his warnings?

3. As a follow-up, MF Global was heavily leveraged. After the experience of the financial crisis, when firms with high leverage ratios failed, why did you undertake a trade that appeared to consume more than half of your remaining capital?

4. MF Global was largely a brokerage firm when you took over. It did not regularly trade in sovereign debt for its own profit, at least not in the manner you did. Why did you feel the need to enter into large trading positions that the company had previously never taken, and do you think trading the firm’s capital in this manner was appropriate and expected by shareholders?

5. You apparently had significant contact with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and its chairman, Gary Gensler, about whether the agency should adopt regulations restricting broker use of client money to trade. Helped in part by your opposition, these rules were not adopted until after the collapse of MF Global.

Mr. Gensler worked for you at Goldman Sachs, and he has now recused himself from the investigation of MF Global. stating that he did not want to become a “distraction.” Can you describe your earlier conversations with Mr. Gensler, and do you believe that you had special access to the agency because of your history with Mr. Gensler?

6. There is still as much as $1.2 billion estimated to be missing in client money entrusted to MF Global. Were you aware that client money was being used to support MF Global’s trades, and if so, why did you not stop it? Who do you think is responsible for this misuse of client money?

7. Another follow-up. As MF Global’s chief executive, you had to sign off on its quarterly financial statements and attest to the firm’s internal controls. How could so much client money apparently be missing, and the records be described by a C.F.T.C. commission as a “disaster,” when you said the internal controls met all legal requirements?

8. Your board reportedly signed off on these trades. In fact, it appears that the board had sole oversight of these investments. What did you tell the board about this trade and do you think directors comprehended the risks?

9. Some 3,000 people have lost their jobs at MF Global, and customers will likely lose significant money. You resigned from MF Global, passing up a pay package of $12.1 million, but if Interactive Brokers Group had acquired your firm, you would have automatically received this amount. Your pay package appears to be a case of heads I win, tails I break even. Do you think that your compensation was appropriate in terms of incentives?

10. This trade was only a multiyear one but could have generated up to $750 million in profit. MF Global lost almost $79 million in 2010. Was it your intent to continue to engage in large trades like this one again to generate MF Global’s profits and, if not, what was your business plan for MF Global?